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OPINION
McKee, Circuit Judge
Giovanni Reid, a state prisoner, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his writ for
a petition of habeas corpus following the district court’s grant of a certificate of
appealability.  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm. 
Inasmuch as we are writing only for the parties who are familiar with the
background of this case, we need not repeat the factual or procedural history except to the
2extent that it may be helpful to our brief discussion.
On appeal, Reid sets forth several claims of error.  Except for one of those claims,
each was thoroughly considered and analyzed in the district court’s thoughtful
Memorandum Opinion dated, August 27, 2003, and we can affirm substantially for the
reasons set forth in that Memorandum Opinion.  
The one issue not covered in that Memorandum Opinion is Reid’s claim that the
district court erred in failing to consider his claim of cumulative error based upon the
combined effect of two alleged Brady violations.  Appellant’s Br. at 24-5.  Reid correctly
notes that, under Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995), individual errors which do not
alone create constitutional error can, when combined, have a cumulative effect which
does rise to the level of constitutional error.  See also Cargle v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1196,
1206 (10th Cir. 2003) (“[a] cumulative-error analysis aggregates all errors found to be
harmless and analyzes whether their cumulative effect on the outcome of the trial is such
that collectively they can no longer be determined to be harmless.”).  Thus, Reid need
establish only two elements: “(1) at least two errors were committed in the course of the
trial; [and] (2) considered together, along with the entire record, the multiple errors so
infected the jury’s deliberation that they denied [Reid] a fundamentally fair trial.” 
Alvarez v. Boyd, 225 F.3d 820, 824 (7th Cir. 2000).
Reid’s claim of cumulative error is based upon (1) the failure to disclose the
payment of cash to a witness and (2) the prosecutor’s subsequent “agitated” interaction
3with that witness.  Reid claims that, had these two items been disclosed, “defense counsel
could have argued that the prosecution had such a weak case . . . that it felt compelled to
pressure one witness into changing his testimony and to pay both witnesses hundreds of
dollars to ensure their appearance and cooperation at the preliminary hearing.” 
Appellant’s Br. at 25.  
The district court held a hearing into the disputed factual issues underlying Reid’s
claims and correctly resolved each of the claims on their individual merits.  We can add
little to the district court’s thoughtful explanation of its rejection of those claims, and
Reid’s attempt to weave them into an enhanced claim by invoking the doctrine of
cumulative error under Kyles does not change the result.  Thus, because we conclude that
the cumulative effect of these two violations did not “so infect[] the jury’s deliberation
that they denied [Reid] a fundamentally fair trial,” Reid is not entitled to relief under
Kyles and the cumulative-error doctrine. 
Therefore, for the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the district court’s order
dated August 28, 2003.
